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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 86-3728
24 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

FROM: Eloise R. Page
Chairman

SUBJECT: CIPC Study of Intelligence as a Force Multiplier

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1. The DCI has asked the CIPC to review and develop the concept of intelligence as a force multiplier, i.e., the role of the NF1B in enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of US military forces.

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2. [redacted] will serve as Chairman of the Task Force to which each interested CIPC member organization is invited to name a representative. Please have your representatives, principal and alternate, pass their names and clearances to the CIPC Staff before 1 May.

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3. Please address any comments or questions on the subject to the CIPC Executive Secretary, [redacted] commercial, or [redacted]

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Eloise R. Page

Attachment: Terms of Reference

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INTELLIGENCE AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER: THE ROLE OF THE NFIP IN ENHANCING US MILITARY CAPABILITIES

TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. BACKGROUND

A. The concept of intelligence as a force multiplier is of growing interest largely because of concern about sustaining the ability of technically superior US and allied weapons systems to compensate for numerical force disadvantages. In situations where the quantity of opposing forces cannot be fully offset by the quality of weapons systems, ways must be found to improve efficiency and effectiveness of US military forces. [REDACTED]

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B. For warfighting, strategic and tactical intelligence can multiply, or enhance, the combat effectiveness of military forces by enabling deployments and maneuvers that take maximum advantage of the situation (battle management) and by quickly and accurately locating hostile units for attack (targeting). These functions apply to all levels of warfare in all theaters and in all operational environments, not just to the dominant scenario involving NATO defense in central Europe against numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces. [REDACTED]

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C. While there is a general perception that national intelligence assets are of significant value to military operating forces, there is also a certain apprehension about their actual availability to these forces. This is a central issue which must be squarely addressed. [REDACTED]

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D. In peacetime and in support of deterrence, the force multiplier effect contributes to the planning and management of US forces and the acquisition of weapon systems. Intelligence defines targets and threats and provides technical signatures data for the design of weapon systems. [REDACTED]

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II. PURPOSE

The study will explain the general principles underlying the concept of intelligence as a force multiplier, using both logic and historical anecdote. It will discuss the warfighting intelligence requirements of US ground, air, and naval forces for battle management and targeting purposes at all levels of conflict; assess the effects of the multiplier for deterrence and in weapon system acquisition; identify the contributions of military intelligence assets toward meeting these requirements; evaluate the potential of NFIP resources to narrow gaps which remain; and recommend DCI actions accordingly. [REDACTED]

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III. STUDY OUTLINE

- Concept of Intelligence as a Force Multiplier.
 - General principles (i.e., the logic) underlying the concept.
 - Multiplying the combat effectiveness of US military forces for battle management and targeting. [REDACTED]

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- Contributions toward Offsetting Numerical Force Disadvantages:
 - Improving the efficiency of force employment (i.e., supporting the theater commander's warfighting intelligence needs).
 - Deterrence--defense planning and management.
 - Weapons systems design and acquisition.
 - The kinds of potential intelligence contributions having force multiplier effects including I&W.
- Illustrative Situations for which the Principles Apply.
 - For the various levels of warfare from contingency operations to strategic nuclear war.
 - For the various warfare theater (e.g, EUCOM, PACOM, etc.) and operational environments.
 - As applied to general purpose ground, air, and naval forces and to strategic forces.
- Intelligence Requirements/Needs of the Various Military Forces.
 - Perspectives of the CINCs of the various unified and specified commands and of other military leaders.
 - The Theater Intelligence Architecture Program of the OSD/DIA.
 - The Allied Command Operational Intelligence Requirements (AOIRs).
 - The Defense-wide Intelligence Plan (D-WIP) for supporting warfighting capabilities.
- Contributions of Intelligence for Satisfying Requirements.
 - Assets controlled by the military forces--general assessment.
 - Tactical intelligence programs of the individual military services (TIARA).
 - Intelligence processing facilities in the various theater/unified and specified commands.
 - NFIP resources and programs:
 - Collection (all sources.)
 - Analysis and production.

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- Dissemination and other matters pertaining to the availability of and access to intelligence (the roles of the Senior Executive Planning Committee, the TENCAP organizations of the services, and the NFIP/TIARA Review Board).
- Special issue: The availability of communications for intelligence support.
- Narrowing Gaps and Recommendations.
 - Concerning improvements in the contributions of NFIP resources and programs.
 - By the various intelligence disciplines.
 - Organizational arrangements.
 - Concerning appropriate ways to reflect the findings of the study in the generation of the NFIP budget.

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IV. ADMINISTRATION

A. This study will be conducted by a task force consisting of selected Intelligence Community representatives. Its Chairman will be responsible for conducting the study and ensuring that the report is submitted to the Executive Secretary, CIPC, by the end of July so that the study may be reviewed at the August meeting of the CIPC.

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APPROVED:

Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

Date

DISAPPROVED:

Chairman, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

Date

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DCI/ICS/CIPC [redacted] (15 Apr '86)
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